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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of financial depth in evaluating the asym-
metric impact of monetary policy on real output over the course of the US business
cycle. We show that monetary policy has a significant impact on output growth during
recessions. We also show that financial deepening plays an important role by dampen-
ing the effects of monetary policy shocks in recessions. The results are robust to the
use of alternative financial depth and monetary policy shock measures as well as to
two different sample periods.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast body of empirical literature which examines the effects of monetary policy
on the real economy. Several researchers in monetary economics have claimed that the
impact of monetary policy on the real economy varies over the course of the business cycle.
For instance, some researchers, referring to sticky prices and nominal wages, relate the
asymmetry to the sign of the monetary policy shocks.1 Others have argued, on the basis of
menu cost models, that the impact of monetary policy depends on the size of the shock rather
than the sign.2 Still others, referring to the credit channel, suggest that the asymmetry of
monetary policy shocks relates to the state of the business cycle.3
There is also a long and well-established research in macroeconomics which shows that
credit market imperfections play a significant role in magnifying output fluctuations.4 The
literature claims that financial market distortions create a powerful source of propagation
by means of a financial accelerator mechanism; that is, an unanticipated adverse (monetary)
shock would decrease not only the demand for capital but also the firms’ net worth, thereby
inducing a further drop in investment and output. Research, therefore, suggests that an
economy with deeper financial markets could mitigate the adverse effects of shocks, as in-
novative firms could continue to draw funds from potential lenders even during economic
downturns.
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether monetary policy has asymmetric effects
over the course of the business cycle, and the extent to which financial frictions affect the
transmission of monetary policy shocks as the economy evolves. Earlier research that has
examined the asymmetric effects of monetary policy during booms versus recessions was
1See for instance, Cover, 1992, DeLong and Summers (1988), Karras, 1996.
2See for instance, Ball and Romer, 1990, Ball and Mankiw, 1994, Ravn and Sola, 2004.
3Among others see, for example, Garcia and Schaller (2002), Lo and Piger (2005), and Dolado and
Mar´ıa-Dolores (2006).
4See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1996), Bernanke et al. (1999). Also see
Levine (2005) and Papaioannou (2007) for detailed surveys of this literature.
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unclear as to whether asymmetries were driven by the convexity of the supply curve or
by financial market frictions. The empirical framework proposed here allows us to identify
directly both whether financial market frictions affect the transmission of monetary policy
shocks and whether financial deepening mitigates the adverse effects of shocks as the financial
accelerator mechanism suggests.5 To carry out our investigation, we augment our model with
an interaction term between monetary policy shock and financial depth measures, which
act as a proxy of financial frictions, and estimate the resulting model by an instrumental
variable Markov regime switching (MRS) framework, as suggested by Spagnolo et al. (2005).
This framework allows us to examine the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks in
conjunction with the role that financial depth plays, while the instrumental variable approach
helps us to overcome endogeneity problems that may exist in our model.
Our investigation utilizes two separate financial depth measures. Our first measure is
defined as the ratio of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector with respect
to GDP. The second measure is the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total
domestic credit (excluding credit to money banks). To gauge the effects of monetary policy
shocks on real output, we have used three proxies. First, we follow a conventional approach
to measuring monetary policy shocks by using the actual changes in the Federal funds rate as
a policy measure.6 However, Romer and Romer (2004) have shown that the actual changes in
the Federal funds rate could underestimate the impact of monetary policy on output growth,
as this measure may have been contaminated by the endogenous movements of the interest
rate and the expected actions of the Federal Reserve (Fed). To address these difficulties,
Romer and Romer (2004) proposed an alternative measure by regressing the intended fund
rate changes on the Fed’s internal forecast of inflation and of real economic activity. In our
5Peersman and Smets (2005), using industry level data from seven Euro area countries, implement a
two step modeling approach in order to provide support for the financial accelerator mechanism. However,
they do not examine how changes in financial deepening affect the asymmetries in monetary policy over the
business cycle.
6See, for instance, Garcia and Schaller, 2002.
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case, rather than directly implementing the model that Romer and Romer (2004) used to
generate monetary policy shocks, we modify it such that in one case the model’s parameters
are allowed to be time-variant and in the other case the parameters are allowed to be time-
varying with regime switching. This modification to the original model was essential because
there is substantial evidence that monetary policy has become more forward-looking; failure
to account for structural breaks in the data could lead to biased results in evaluating the
impact of monetary policy shocks.7
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We first show that monetary policy has a
regime-dependent impact on output growth. In particular, we show that adverse monetary
policy shocks exert a significant influence on output growth during recessions, yet this effect is
not significant during expansions. We then provide evidence that financial depth significantly
mitigates the impact of these adverse shocks during recessions: the total impact of adverse
monetary policy shocks on output growth becomes much milder in recessions, and even
diminishes with the deepening of the financial markets. This makes sense; firms mostly
suffer from financial frictions during periods of recessions, so deeper financial markets could
help firms to raise funds even in hard times. We carried out the analysis using quarterly US
data over the period 1971:q1-2011:q4. We also estimated the model over 1971:q1-2008:q2,
excluding the period that followed the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on the basis that the
framework of monetary policy changed substantially after this episode. Results from this
subsample also support to our claims.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the empirical literature.
Section 3 introduces the data, the model and the methodology that is utilized in our analysis.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the study.
7See for instance Barakchian and Crowe (2013).
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2 Brief Literature Review
There exists a substantial body of literature examining the impact of monetary policy on the
real economy. Although vector autoregressive (VAR) models have been the main workhorse
of researchers in examining the effects of monetary policy on the economy, more recently
several researchers have begun to implement stochastic volatility (SV) models to investigate
the transmission of shocks on real variables.8 SV models, although attractive, have a ten-
dency to anticipate the changes in volatility before they actually happen in cases where the
underlying process has discrete jumps. This arises due to the fact that these models favor
small changes in the data over large ones. As Diebold (1986) argued, the SV model could
severely bias estimates and invalidate inferences if abrupt shifts in the data were ignored.
As a consequence, when the data present sudden regime shifts, it is advisable to use other
approaches.
To this end, researchers have been using Markov regime switching models to examine the
asymmetric effects of monetary policy on the economy. Using this methodology, it has been
shown that monetary policy shocks exert asymmetric effects on the real economy over the
course of the business cycle. For instance, Garcia and Schaller (2002), provided evidence that
monetary policy in the US has larger effects during recessions than expansions. Using data
from seven euro-area countries, Peersman and Smets (2002, 2005) have demonstrated that
regional shocks have a more profound effect on output during recessions than expansions.
Kaufmann (2002), using data from Austria provided evidence that the impact of monetary
policy on output growth is significant and negative during economic recessions, and insignif-
icant during periods of normal or above average output growth. Dolado and Mar´ıa-Dolores
(2006), implementing a multivariate Markov switching model, showed that the effects of
8See for instance Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2013), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013) Mumtaz
and Theodoridis (2015) and the references therein.
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monetary policy on real output growth in the euro-area depend on the state of the business
cycle.
The observation that adverse monetary policy shocks exert a significant impact on eco-
nomic activities in recessions is also corroborated by Weise (1999), who used a logistic smooth
transition vector autoregressive model to examine the asymmetries in monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. Similarly, using UK data and implementing a smooth transition regression
model, Sensier et al. (2002) showed that monetary policy is more powerful in recessions than
in expansions. Lo and Piger (2005), also using an unobserved-component model with regime
switching and time varying transition probabilities, argued that changes in monetary policy
have stronger real effects in the US during recessions than in expansions. Subsequently,
Ho¨ppner et al. (2008) confirmed the asymmetry of monetary policy over the course of the
US business cycle by applying a time-varying coefficient VAR model. However, none of these
studies have considered the role that financial deepening may play in evaluating the asym-
metric effect of monetary policy shocks on the economy during the course of the business
cycle.
When we turn to examine the importance of financial market frictions on growth and
productivity, we find a deep and expanding body of literature starting with the work of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989). The empirical evidence, based on aggregate data, suggests
that the development and deepening of financial markets enable firms to have easier access
to external funds, thereby dampening the impact of negative shocks on the economy. Similar
conclusions have been provided by researchers examining industry or firm-level data. For
instance, Raddatz (2006) found that greater financial depth significantly reduced output
volatility, especially in sectors which require a high level of liquidity. He argues that his
results provide strong evidence of the importance of financial development in reducing output
fluctuations. This is because an increase in financial market depth improves the ability of
the financial system to provide liquidity to firms during recessions.
6
Separately, Ferreira da Silva (2002), using data from 40 countries over the period 1960-
1997, showed that countries with deeper financial markets experience smoother business
cycles. In the same spirit, Beck, Chen, Chen, and Song (2012) have found that a higher
level of financial innovation not only increases a country’s growth opportunities, capital
and GDP per capita growth, but also increases the growth rates of industries which are
more dependent on external finance and financial innovation. Cowan and Raddatz (2013)
have shown that firms that operate in sectors which need high external financing contract
relatively more following sharp reductions in international capital flows. Taken together,
these studies suggest that financial deepening plays an important role in relation to the
smooth functioning of the economy and the transmission of shocks.
In the rest of the paper, using more than 40 years of quarterly data, we empirically exam-
ine the asymmetric effects of monetary policy during booms and recessions while considering
the role of financial deepening in the transmission of monetary policy shocks. To this end, we
have implement an instrumental variable Markov regime switching framework. The use of
an instrumental variable approach is essential in a study such as this, as the results may be
affected by endogeneity due to the potential correlation between the explanatory variables
and the disturbance term.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We have conducted our analysis using quarterly US data over the period 1971:q1-2011:q4.
The data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). We have measured output growth (yt) in period t, by the first dif-
ference of the logarithm of the real GDP index (2005=100), IFS line 99b.
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3.1.1 Measuring Financial Depth
We use two different measures to determine the extent of the financial depth (fdt) in the
economy. These measures allow us to evaluate the amount of credit given to the private
sector. Our first financial depth measure (FD1), which is proposed by Levine et al. (2000),
is the ratio of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector with respect to GDP.
This measure has been constructed as 0.5 ∗
[
F (t)
Pend(t)
+ F (t−1)
Pend(t−1)
]
/GDP (t)
Pave(t)
. In this measure, F
denotes quarterly credit loaned by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to
the private sector (IFS lines 22d+42d), Pend is end-of period quarterly consumer price index
(CPI), Pave is the average CPI for the quarter and GDP is seasonally adjusted nominal
quarterly gross domestic product (IFS line 99b). Quarterly CPI is extracted from IFS line
64. Specifically, this depth measure includes only those credits issued by banks and other
financial intermediaries. Following Levine et al. (2000), we measure the items on the financial
intermediary balance sheets at the end of the period; however, GDP is measured over the
whole period. Thus, the end-of-period items in financial intermediary balance sheets are
deflated by the end of period CPI, while the GDP series is deflated by the average CPI for
the period.
Our second financial depth measure (FD2), proposed by King and Levine (1993), is the
ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total domestic credit (excluding credit
to money banks). Total domestic credit is composed of claims on central government, on
state and local governments, on public nonfinancial corporations and on the nonfinancial
private sector. Claims on the nonfinancial private sector are extracted from IFS line 32d
and total domestic credit is taken from IFS lines 32a through 32f excluding 32e. This proxy
provides information on the percentage of credit allocated to private firms in the economy.
It therefore measures the extent to which credit is allocated to the private rather than the
public sector.
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3.1.2 Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks
A quick survey of the literature shows that researchers use the VAR methodology heavily
when examining the effects of monetary policy. However, given that the policy makers have
become more forward-looking over the years, as Barakchian and Crowe (2013) have demon-
strated, the identification of structural shocks in VAR models has become a more difficult
task.9 This is due to the fact that, when agents react to expected variables that are not
observed by the econometricians, non-fundamentalness emerges.10 Benati and Surico (2009)
have also argued that there is a fundamental disconnect between what is actually structural
within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and what is considered to be
structural in the structural VAR representation implied by the same DSGE model. At the
very least, recent research has shown that comparison of structural VAR (SVAR) estimates
with those from a DSGE model is not straightforward and that caution must be exercised
when comparing the two models.11
Given these concerns, we employed three different proxies to gauge the stance of the
monetary policy. As a first measure of monetary policy shocks, we used the first difference
of the logarithm of the Federal Funds rate (mpt), IFS line 60b. This is a simple and a con-
ventional measure, which has been previously used by many researchers to gauge monetary
policy shocks.12 However, this approach is subject to two main shortcomings. First, Federal
funds rate often moves endogenously with changes in economic conditions. Such endogenous
movements lead to biased estimates of the impact of monetary policy on the target variables.
For instance, an endogenous response of the fund rates to economic activities might lead one
to underestimate the impact of monetary policy on the real variables.13 Furthermore, when
9For more see, among others, Leeper et al. (1996), Christiano et al. (1999).
10A model is non-fundamental when structural shocks cannot be recovered by current and past observa-
tions; see Hansen and Sargent (1991).
11For further discussion see Kilian (2012).
12See, for instance, Sims (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Garcia and Schaller (2002).
13See Romer and Romer (2004).
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analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and on inflation, one should
measure the variation in the policy rates that is orthogonal to the Fed’s forecast of future
output and inflation.
To circumvent these hurdles, we have adopted the Romer and Romer (2004) approach
and have generated two additional monetary policy shocks by introducing time-varying pa-
rameters and regime shifts into their model. The second proxy, which we used to gauge
monetary policy shocks, therefore allowed for time-variation in all parameters of the eigh-
teen variables in Romer and Romer (2004). The third monetary policy shock allowed for the
parameters of the underlying model to be time-varying with regime shifts while we only use
those variables that are significant in construction of the second proxy.14
3.2 Methodology
In order to examine the role of financial frictions when evaluating the asymmetric impact
of monetary policy on real output, we implemented a Markov switching framework. In im-
plementing this approach one has to be careful against the possibility of endogeneity of the
monetary policy and the financial depth measures, which we have used as explanatory vari-
ables in the output growth equation. In this case, the use of standard maximum likelihood
approach in estimating a regime switching model would yield inconsistent parameter esti-
mates as a result of the within-regime correlation between the regressors and the disturbance
term. To overcome the endogeneity problem in this case, we followed an approach suggested
by Spagnolo et al. (2005) and estimated the following system of equations for output growth
and the instrumenting equations for monetary policy and for financial depth:
14Romer and Romer (2004) measured monetary policy shocks using a reaction function, in which the
desired Federal funds target rate was the dependent variable and the right-hand side variables included the
level of the desired Federal funds target prior to the FOMC meeting, and the forecasts of 17 series (the
current quarter of unemployment, eight forecasts for the real GDP growth and the GDP deflator) taken
from the Greenbook.
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yt = µst +
j∑
i=1
γi,styt−i + βstm̂pt−1 + ϕst f̂dt + ηstm̂pt−1 × f̂dt−1 + σstεt (1)
where
µst = [µ0 (1− st) + µ1st] , γi,st = [γi,0 (1− st) + γi,1st] ,
βst = [β0 (1− st) + β1st] , ϕst = [ϕ0 (1− st) + ϕ1st] ,
ηst = [η0 (1− st) + η1st] , and σst = [σ0 (1− st) + σ1st]
mpt−1 = κst +
k∑
i=1
δi,styt−i−1 +
l∑
i=1
φi,stmpt−i−1 + θstξt (2)
where
κst = κ0 (1− st) + κ1st, δi,st = δi,0 (1− st) + δi,1st,
φi,st = φi,0 (1− st) + φi,1st and θst = θ0 (1− st) +θ1st
fdt = αst +
m∑
i=1
λi,stfdt−i + χstςt (3)
where
αst = α0(1− st) + α1st, λi,st = λi,0(1− st) + λi,1st and
χst = χ0(1− st) + χ1st
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The state variable, st, is a homogenous first order Markov chain on {0, 1} with transition
probabilities:
q = P [st = 0 | st−1 = 0],
p = P [st = 1 | st−1 = 1].
(4)
In this system, equation (1) models real output growth (yt), equation (2) models monetary
policy (mpt−1) and equation (3) models financial depth (fdt), while all explanatory variables
have state dependent coefficients. The disturbance terms in equations (1-3) are captured
by ǫt, ξt and ςt, respectively. The first equation includes the lags of the dependent variable,
a measure of expected financial depth (f̂dt), and, to capture the observation that output
growth reacts to changes in monetary policy with a lag, the first lag of expected monetary
policy (m̂pt−1). The output growth equation also includes an interaction term between
the first lag of financial depth and the first lag of monetary policy measure: (m̂pt−1 ×
f̂dt−1). The interaction term is of key importance, as it allows us to examine whether the
effects of monetary policy on output growth are dependent on the extent of the financial
depth. In particular, significant coefficients over high or low growth states can help us to
determine whether financial depth dampens or intensifies the impact of monetary policy
on real output over the course of the business cycle. The fitted value of monetary policy,
m̂pt−1 = E [mpt−1 | st−1,Ωt−1], is obtained from equation (2), where s denotes the unobserved
state variable and Ωt−1 denotes the information set available at time t− 1. In the same way,
the fitted value of financial depth, f̂dt = E [fdt | st,Ωt], is obtained from instrumenting
equation (3).
Equation (2) is a reduced-form model for monetary policy shocks, mpt−1, which is as-
sumed to respond asymmetrically to the second lag of output and to the lagged dependent
variable. Equation (3) models financial depth as an autoregressive process in which the
12
associated parameters depend on the state of the economy.15
To estimate this model we have used a recursive algorithm, which is explained in Hamilton
(1994). This process yields a sample likelihood function which can be maximized numerically
with respect to ν = (µ0, µ1, γ1,0, γ1,1, γ2,0, γ2,1, · · · , γj,0, γj,1, β0, β1, ϕ0, ϕ1, η0, η1, σ0, σ1, κ0, κ1,
δ1,0, δ1,1, δ2,0, δ2,1, · · · , δj,0, δj,1, φ1,0, φ1,1, φ2,0, φ2,1, · · · , φj,0, φj,1θ0, θ1, α0, α1, λi,0, λi,1, λ2,0, λ2,1,
· · · , λj,0, λj,1, χ0, χ1) subject to the constraint that p and q lie in the open unit interval. In
consequence, we can write the conditional probability density function of wt =(yt, mpt, fdt)
given the state st and the history of the system:
pdf(wt | st, wt−1, ..., w1; ν) = 1√
2πσst
exp−1
2
(
yt − µst −
∑J
j=1 γj,styt−j − βstm̂pt−1 − ϕst f̂dt − ηstm̂pt−1 × f̂dt−1
σst
)2
× 1√
2πθst
exp−1
2
(
mpt−1 − κst −
∑K
k=1 δk,styt−k−1 −
∑L
l=1 φl,stmpt−l−1
θst
)2
× 1√
2πχst
exp−1
2
(
fdt − αst −
∑M
i=1 λi,stfdt−i
χst
)2
(5)
Here m̂pt−1 = κ̂st +
∑K
k=1 δ̂k,styt−k−1 +
∑L
l=1 φ̂l,stmpt−l−1 and f̂dt = α̂st +
∑M
i=1 λ̂i,stfdt−i are
obtained from the state-dependent instrumenting equations for mpt−1 and fdt as shown in
(2) and (3).
Note that the system of equations in (1-4) assumes that the unobserved state variables
15The set of instruments used has been selected on the basis of the statistical significance of variables. We
used a general model in which each equation included the same indicators. Specifically, we initially estimated
a fourth order VAR model. We then selected those indicators which were statistically significant.
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of GDP growth, monetary policy and financial depth measures are synchronized. Before
carrying out the empirical analysis, we first examined the interrelations between the unob-
served states of the variables in the model. Based on this investigation, we chose a model
to examine the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on output growth while taking into
account the role of financial depth. This will be discussed in section 3.3.
3.3 Modeling the Unobserved States
Our empirical model examines the asymmetric effects of monetary policy during booms and
recessions taking into account the role of financial market depth. However, before estimating
equations 1-4, it is important to examine the interrelations between the unobserved states
of the variables in the model. Without such an investigation, it would be unclear whether
the unobserved states of the variables are in the same or different phases with respect to one
another and we would not be able to construct an appropriate switching model. To illustrate
the problem at hand, let us examine the interaction between the unobserved states of yt and
fdt. Consider a 2× 1 vector zt = [yt, fdt]′ such that16
zt = µst +
p∑
i=1
Φizt−i + vt (6)
where vt = [u
y
t , u
fd
t ]
′ is a Gaussian process with mean zero and positive-definite variance
covariance matrix Σ; {st}, the unobserved state of z, is modeled by the unobserved states
16The model can be easily extended to account for three variables where zt = [yt, fdt,mpt]
′. However, for
the sake of clarity, we have limited our examination to the case where zt includes only two variables. If zt
were to be three-dimensional then the latent variable szt would follow an 8-state Markov chain.
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of syt and s
fd
t as a linear homogenous four-state Markov process with
17
szt = 1 if s
fd
t = 1 and s
y
t = 1 (7)
szt = 2 if s
fd
t = 2 and s
y
t = 1
szt = 3 if s
fd
t = 1 and s
y
t = 2
szt = 4 if s
fd
t = 2 and s
y
t = 2
Under these conditions, there are four possible models that can be examined. Model A
considers the case in which the unobserved states associated with both variables (syt and s
fd
t )
are independent. To capture this, we constructed the following transition probability matrix
for szt :
PAyfd = P
y ⊗ P fd =

py
11
pfd
11
py
11
pfd
21
py
21
pfd
11
py
21
pfd
21
py
11
pfd
12
py
11
pfd
22
py
21
pfd
12
py
21
pfd
22
py
12
pfd
11
py
12
pfd
21
py
22
pfd
11
py
22
pfd
21
py
12
pfd
12
py
12
pfd
22
py
22
pfd
12
py
22
pfd
22

(8)
Model B, which is suggested by Schwert (1989) and Campbell et al. (1998), considers the
case of perfect synchronization of the states of both variables such that syt = s
fd
t . In this
model the unobserved state variable szt follows a two-state Markov process with the transition
probability matrix:
PByfd =

py
11
pfd
11
0 0 py
21
pfd
21
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
py12p
fd
12
0 0 py
22
pfd
22

(9)
17For more details see Phillips (1991), Hamilton and Lin (1996) and Sola et al. (2007).
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It should be noted that Model B has fewer parameters than Model A, as the number of
states are reduced from four to two.18 This reduction in states occurs because Model B
imposes the restriction that pyij = p
fd
ij ; that is, the unobserved states of both variables are
perfectly synchronized. In consequence, one may expect to observe a worse fit when Model
B is implemented in place of Model A. However, Model B allows for dependence between y
and fd through the common dependence of the unobserved syt . This relaxes the assumption
of independence maintained in Model A and might lead to an improved fit.19
An alternative model, Model C, can be constructed for the case in which the unobserved
state of financial depth measure leads the unobserved state of output growth (i.e. syt = s
fd
t−1).
In this case, the transition probability matrix of szt takes the form:
PCyfd =

py
11
pfd
11
0 py
21
pfd
11
0
py
11
pfd
12
0 py
21
pfd
12
0
0 py
12
pfd
21
0 py
22
pfd
21
0 py
12
pfd
22
0 py
22
pfd
22

(10)
In this model, expectations about the future state of output affect the current state of
financial depth.
Finally, if financial depth reacts to expectations concerning a variable other than output,
then the unobserved state of output might lead the unobserved state of financial depth
measure (sfdt = s
y
t−1). Hence, in model D, the transition probability matrix of s
z
t will be:
18This implies that Models A and B are non-nested because, under the reduction of states, the two state
model suffers from the standard nuisance parameter problem.
19See Hamilton and Lin (1996) along these lines.
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PDyfd =

py
11
pfd
11
py
11
pfd
21
0 0
0 0 py
21
pfd
12
py
21
pfd
22
py
12
pfd
11
py
12
pfd
21
0 0
0 0 py
22
pfd
12
py
22
pfd
22

(11)
Using models A,B,C and D, it is possible to examine the interrelations between the
unobserved states of the associated variables. However, prior to implementing any of the
above models, it is useful to estimate univariate MRS models for each variable and to compare
their associated filter probabilities. This exercise helps in determining whether or not the
unobserved states of the variables are synchronized. After this experiment, the models
discussed in this section can be implemented. We present our findings in Section 4.
3.4 Other Econometric Issues
To implement the Markov regime switching framework, the data must exhibit regime shifts.
We follow Hansen (1992a, 1996) to test for regime switching. Note that the null hypothesis of
linearity against the alternative of a Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using
a standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. This is owing to the fact that under the null of linearity
the parameters of transition probabilities are unidentified and the scores with respect to
parameters of interest are identically zero. Under such circumstances the information matrix
is singular. We, therefore apply Hansen’s standardized likelihood ratio test, which requires
an evaluation of the likelihood function across a grid of different values for the transition
probabilities.20
20In accordance with the suggestion of one of our referees, we modified the Hansen routine to check whether
equation (1) has two regimes. Results from this test are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 1
and are available from the authors upon request.
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4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we first provide evidence that all variables in equations 1-3 follow a Markov
regime switching process. Second, we estimate univariate MRS models for each of the vari-
ables to determine the synchronicity of the unobserved states of the variables that we employ
in our model. Third, we estimate equations 1-4 using one of the models that we discussed
in Section 3.3. For all cases, we present results for the full model. However, having observed
that the level of financial depth does not have a significant effect on output growth, we have
excluded it from our latter models. We have estimated the model for the full sample as well
as up to the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers to avoid the post crisis period
during which the Fed changed its approach to stimulating the economy. We gauge monetary
policy shocks using the change in interest rates and two additional policy measures to check
for the robustness of our empirical results. The results are similar for both sample periods,
both financial depth measures and all three monetary policy shock measures.
4.1 Preliminary Tests
Table 1 shows that the Hansen test rejects the null of linearity for the change in interest
rate and the first measure of financial development. However, the null of linearity for GDP
growth and the second measure of financial depth cannot be rejected. This might be due
to the low power of the test when the model accounts for autoregressive dynamics. To
further investigate the presence of regime switching, we implemented structural break tests
proposed by Hansen (1992b), Andrews (1993), and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) for the
output growth equation, (1), as we employed both financial depth measures. We applied the
same tests for the instrumenting equation of the financial depth measures, equation (3), as
well. The null hypothesis for these tests is that parameters are stable while the alternative
is that there is evidence of a one-time change at the break point. The Hansen (1992b) tests
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(see Table 2) indicate that there is parameter instability in the output growth equation and
the instrumenting equation for financial depth.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 about here
The second issue that must be resolved is the synchronicity of the unobserved states
of the variables in the model. Only after examining the synchronicity of the states of the
variables that we use in the model can we determine which of the four models discussed in
Section 3.3 could be used for our analysis. Following an approach similar to that in Hamilton
and Lin (1996), as preliminary check, we estimated a univariate Markov switching model for
each variable and generated the associated filter probabilities. We then superimposed the
filter probability of output growth on the filter probabilities of financial depth and monetary
policy measures and displayed them on separate panels in Figure 1. The top and bottom
panels show that the filter probability of output growth (see Filter Y ) is similar to that of
the monetary policy measure (see Filter DIR) and the second financial depth measure (see
Filter FD2). Equipped with this evidence, we use Model B to examine the relationship
between output growth, monetary policy shock and the second financial depth measure.
However, the middle panel demonstrates that the filter probability of the first financial
depth (see Filter FD1) differs from that of output growth for almost the first ten years of
the sample. Therefore, when using the first financial depth measure, we must use one of the
remaining three models that we discussed in section 3.3.
Figure 1 about here
To assess the extent to which the unobserved states of the first financial depth measure
(FD1) is aligned with those of the output growth and the proxy for monetary policy, we
estimated Model A and plotted the filter probabilities for each of the possible four states in
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Figure 2, (States 1-4). States 1 and 4 depict the filter probabilities when the unobserved
state variables are synchronized. Similarly, States 2 and 3 show the filter probabilities
when the unobserved state variables are not synchronized. Looking at each panel, we see
that although the filter probabilities of State 2 and State 3 are low, they are not close to
zero. In Figure 3, the upper graph shows the sum of the probabilities when the unobserved
states of both variables are in the same phase, while the lower graph shows the sum of the
probabilities when the unobserved states of both variables are in differing phases. The lower
plot in Figure 3 gives the impression that the sum of the filter probabilities of States 2 and
3 is substantially high approximately for the first and the last 10 years of the sample. This
observation suggests that the unobserved states of FD1 differ from the other variables in the
model. As a result, we estimated all four models for FD1 and allow the data to determine
the best model.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
4.2 Results for the Full Sample
Table 3 presents estimates for equations 1-4 when we estimate Models A, B, C and D for the
first proxy of financial depth, FD1.21 By inspecting the coefficient estimates, we see that in
all cases the state dependent growth rate µ0 is greater than µ1. Hence, State zero captures
the high growth regime and State 1 captures the low growth regime. We can also observe
that the impact of monetary policy shocks (β) is negative and this impact significantly
varies between different states in each Model. This is suggestive of the asymmetric impact of
monetary policy shocks between regimes. Furthermore, we also observe that the interaction
term between the proxy for monetary policy shocks and financial depth is positive and
21To facilitate the presentation of our results, we withheld the estimates for the instrumenting equations;
these are available upon request from the authors.
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significant in the low growth state (η1) for all four Models. Nevertheless, the level effect of
financial depth on output growth (ϕ) is always insignificant.
Table 3 about here
In the light of the results presented in Table 3, we re-estimated the model after excluding
the level effect of financial depth. The results for the restricted model are given in Table
4. The estimates of the state dependent growth rate µ0 are positive and significant whereas
the estimates of µ1 are not significantly different from zero. This clearly suggests that State
zero captures the high growth regime and State 1 captures the low growth regime. Further-
more, the other coefficients in the model demonstrate the expected signs and significance.
Specifically, we observed that monetary policy has a negative and significant impact only in
the low growth regime, suggesting the presence of asymmetric impact of monetary policy
shocks on output growth. When we inspect the interaction coefficient (η) between monetary
policy and financial depth, we see that it is positive and significant only in the low growth
regime. This result confirms the conjecture that financial depth dampens the negative effect
of adverse monetary policy shocks on economic activity during recessions.
These observations are true for all four models; however, Model A appears to perform
better than Models B, C and D. Henceforth, the role of the first financial depth measure is
discussed in the context of Model A.
Table 4 about here
Next, we estimate equations 1-4 using Model B for the second financial depth proxy,
FD2.22 The results are presented in Table 5. The first two columns of the Table give
the parameter estimates and the standard errors when the level effect of financial depth is
included in the model. The remaining two columns give the estimates and their standard
errors when the level effect is removed.
22Recall that in Model B the unobserved states of all variables in the model are synchronized.
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As in Model A, State zero captures the high growth regime and State 1 captures the
low growth regime. However, an inspection of the first two columns shows that most of the
coefficient estimates are not significant. When we turn to the latter two columns, which
exclude the level effect of financial depth, we see that the coefficient estimates demonstrate
the expected sign and significance. Specifically, we observe that the effect of monetary
policy (β) is significantly negative only in the low growth state, indicating the presence of
asymmetry. We also observe that the interaction coefficient becomes significantly positive
in the low growth regime.
Table 5 about here
4.3 Results for the pre-Financial Crisis Period: 1971:q1-2008:q2
In order to evaluate whether these results are robust to the exclusion of observations from the
period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we re-estimate our models with a focus on the
pre-financial crisis period between 1971:q1 and 2008:q2.23 The results presented in Table 6
are largely similar to our observations for the full sample. The first two columns present the
results for the first financial depth measure, while the latter two columns give the results for
the second financial depth measure. As in Tables 3-5 the state dependent growth rate µ0 is
positive and significant for State zero and insignificant for State 1; hence, State zero denotes
the high growth regime and State 1 denotes the low growth regime. We found that monetary
policy had asymmetric effects during the period preceding the financial crisis for the first
financial depth measure, but not for the second. In our assessment of the role of financial
depth in the transmission of monetary policy, we have observed that the interaction term
takes a positive and significant coefficient in the low growth state for both financial depth
measures. The positive sign associated with the interaction term suggests that financial
23After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed changed its approach to stimulate the economy, as the
use of conventional monetary policy tools were not effective.
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depth dampens the impact of adverse monetary policy shocks during recessions.
Table 6 about here
Overall, using two different financial depth measures, and two different samples (full data
and pre-financial crisis period) we have drawn two conclusions from our investigation. First,
monetary policy shocks have an asymmetric impact on output growth over the course of
the business cycle. The effect of monetary policy is significant in recessions (the low growth
regime), but not during expansions (the high growth regime). Second, financial deepening
dampens the impact of adverse monetary policy shocks on output growth in low growth
regimes.
4.3.1 Additional Robustness Checks Based on Alternative Monetary Policy
Measures
We have provided additional results by estimating the model for two Romer and Romer
(2004) types of monetary policy shock measures, which allow for time-variation. The first
measure is generated by a model that allows for time varying parameters, while the other
is derived from a model that allows for time varying parameters with regime shifts. The
results for FD2 are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 about here
The first two columns of the table present the coefficient estimates and their standard
variations for the second monetary policy shock measure (RR-TVP), which has been obtained
from a time-varying parameter model. The latter two columns present results for the third
monetary policy shock measure (RR-TVP MRS), which has been obtained from a model in
which the parameters are time-varying and the volatility is regime dependent.
Overall, observations from Table 7 confirm our earlier findings. Here, too, State zero
denotes high growth regime and State 1 denotes low growth regime. Furthermore, regardless
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of the type of monetary policy shock, we can see that the effect of monetary policy (β) is
only significant during the low growth state. When we go on to examine the role of financial
depth, we see that the interaction coefficient (η) is positive and significant during the low
growth regime only. These results provide further support for our earlier findings.
4.4 The Full Impact of Monetary Policy
So far, we have shown that adverse monetary policy shocks exert a significant negative impact
on output growth only during low growth states and that financial deepening dampens
these effects. These results are intuitively plausible and highlight the significant role that
financial frictions play in the transmission of monetary policy. However, the evidence we have
presented thus far does not capture the full impact of monetary policy on output growth
over the course of the business cycle, nor the full role of financial depth in the transmission
of monetary policy shocks. Hence, we use equation (1) and evaluate the total derivative of
output growth with respect to monetary policy for each state
dyt/dm̂pt−1 =
[
β̂0 (1− st) + β̂1st
]
+ [η̂0 (1− st) + η̂1st] f̂d
∗
t−1 (12)
at various levels of financial depth, f̂d
∗
t−1, while the parameters, β̂i and η̂i, are set to their
point estimates. The estimates β̂i and η̂i capture the direct and indirect impact of monetary
policy on output growth, respectively. The index st denotes the states of the economy where
State zero represents the low growth regime and State 1 represents the high growth regime.
f̂d
∗
t−1 refers to a particular level of financial depth at which we compute the derivative
including the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. Using the parameter estimates
and the associated standard deviations for the first financial depth measure in columns 1
and 2 of Table 4, we compute the full impact of monetary policy on output growth along
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with the associated standard errors.24 In Figure 4, we plot the point estimates that we give
in Table (8), along with their corresponding 95% confidence interval.
Table 8 about here
Figure 4 about here
Panel A in Table (8) (see State zero, Figure (4)) illustrates the full impact of an adverse
monetary policy shock on output growth in expansions. When we inspect the Panel A, we
see that the total impact of monetary policy on output growth is always negative but never
significant, despite the financial deepening.
When we inspect Panel B in Table (8) (See State 1, Figure (4)), we can see that an
adverse monetary policy shock has a significant negative impact on output growth during
recessions, when financial depth is shallow. However, this significant negative impact weakens
and becomes insignificant with financial deepening. In other words, the impact of adverse
monetary policy shocks would be stronger in recessions if the economy were to experience
tight credit market conditions. In fact, when financial deepening is at approximately its
median level, the effect of monetary policy on output growth becomes insignificant at the 5%
level. This suggests that, when liquidity dries up during periods of low growth, the economy
suffers considerably because of adverse monetary policy shocks, as businesses cannot sustain
production and fixed investment in an environment where borrowing is compromised due to
frictions in financial markets.
Our findings are particularly relevant in the light of events that followed the 2008/09
financial crisis. During this period, although central banks throughout the western economies
injected billions of dollars into the system to keep financial markets afloat, businesses shed
employees and canceled or delayed their fixed capital investment expenditures as banks
initially did not extend new credit owing to the uncertainty in the economic environment.
24We have withheld the results for the other financial depth measure as the conclusions are similar.
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Only after credit became more available, did the US economy move out of the recession.
Overall, these recent observations support the view that monetary policy without financial
deepening might be an insufficient force to push the economy out of recession.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we proposed an empirical framework to examine whether monetary policy
has an asymmetric impact on output growth during booms and recessions and whether the
asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks is dependent on financial deepening. To avoid
problems that may arise due to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, we implemented an
instrumental variable Markov regime switching framework, as suggested in Spagnolo et al.
(2005). The analysis is based on quarterly US data covering the period between 1971:q1 and
2011:q4.
Our analysis provides evidence that monetary policy has an asymmetric impact on out-
put growth: restrictive monetary policies lead to a significant drop in output growth during
recessions (low growth states), while such policies do not have any significant impact on out-
put during booms (high growth states). When we examined the role of financial markets, we
observed that financial depth plays a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks, especially during recessions. In fact, our results provided evidence that, although
tight monetary policy might have adverse effects on output growth during recessions, such
effects diminish or even completely disappear with financial deepening. Overall, we have
shown that our results are robust compared to alternative financial depth and monetary
policy shock measures and different sample periods.
The evidence we have presented has important policy implications, as it highlights the
importance of financial deepening in the transmission of monetary policy shocks, especially
in low growth states. More research on the interrelations between financial markets and
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monetary policy will help us to better understand the role that financial deepening plays on
the impact of monetary policy.
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Table 1: Hansen Test Results
y mp FD1 FD2
Standardized LR 0.699 6.344 0.839 2.163
M=0 0.581 0.000 0.468 0.080
M=1 0.560 0.000 0.459 0.059
M=2 0.553 0.000 0.446 0.055
M=3 0.549 0.000 0.436 0.050
M=4 0.542 0.000 0.423 0.053
Notes: Financial depth 1 (FD1) is the ratio of credits by financial interme-
diaries to the private sector with respect to GDP. Financial depth 2 (FD2)
is the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total domestic
credit (excluding credit to money banks).
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Table 2: Stability Tests for Output Growth and Financial Depth Variables
Panel A: Stability Tests for Output Growth Equation
Using financial depth measure FD1
Hansen (1992) 1.596*
Andrews (1993) 6.898
Andrews, Ploberger (1994) 1.616
Using financial depth measure FD2
Hansen (1992) 1.912**
Andrews (1993) 11.546
Andrews, Ploberger (1994) 3.314
Panel B: Stability Tests for Financial Depth; Instrumenting Equation
Financial depth measure: FD1
Hansen (1992) 0.674*
Andrews (1993) 5.587
Andrews, Ploberger (1994) 1.108
Financial depth measure: FD2
Hansen (1992) 0.863**
Andrews (1993) 3.679
Andrews, Ploberger (1994) 0.369
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Each entry depicts the
estimated test statistics associated with the listed reference. See notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: Model selection for FD1 for the full model: Asymmetric effect of mon-
etary policy on output growth (1971:q1-2011:q4)
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D
Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors
µ0 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
γ11 0.156 0.091 0.296** 0.125 0.294*** 0.112 0.293*** 0.110
γ12 0.366*** 0.110 0.245* 0.131 0.290** 0.124 0.293** 0.131
β0 -0.012 0.024 0.013 0.024 0.019 0.038 0.013 0.063
η0 0.003 0.013 -0.009 0.013 -0.017 0.027 -0.011 0.043
ϕ0 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
σ0 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000
µ1 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005
γ21 0.407*** 0.135 0.307*** 0.114 0.271*** 0.103 0.279*** 0.104
γ22 0.495 0.368 0.56* 0.296 0.683** 0.325 0.674** 0.319
β1 -0.194** 0.084 -0.242** 0.095 -0.123*** 0.044 -0.127*** 0.045
η1 0.095** 0.044 0.125** 0.052 0.050** 0.020 0.053*** 0.020
ϕ1 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003
σ1 0.001*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001
p0 0.910*** 0.042 0.918*** 0.046 0.981*** 0.014 0.969*** 0.019
q0 0.899*** 0.054 0.910*** 0.042 0.969*** 0.019 0.981*** 0.014
p1 0.953*** 0.029 - - - - - -
q1 0.905*** 0.070 - - - - - -
Likelihood 1035.800 1024.600 999.570 997.860
Notes: yt = µst +
∑j
i=1 γi,styt−i + βstm̂pt−1 + ϕst f̂dt + ηstm̂pt−1 × f̂dt−1 + σstεt, where yt,
m̂pt−1 and f̂dt denote output growth, expected monetary policy shock and expected financial
depth, respectively. εt is the error term. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels. Model A assumes that the unobserved state of fd is independent from that of y.
Model B assumes that the unobserved state of fd and y are perfectly synchronized. Model C
assumes that the unobserved state of fd leads that of y. Model D assumes that the unobserved
state of and y leads that of fd. FD1 measures the ratio of credit by financial intermediaries
to the private sector with respect to GDP.
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Table 4: Model selection for FD1 without the level effect: Asymmetric effects of
monetary policy on output growth (1971:q1-2011:q4)
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D
Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors
µ0 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
γ11 0.172* 0.097 0.303** 0.117 0.293*** 0.113 0.294*** 0.110
γ12 0.354*** 0.101 0.222* 0.117 0.285** 0.128 0.296** 0.119
β0 -0.020 0.029 -0.030 0.039 0.015 0.049 0.014 0.039
η0 0.007 0.015 0.014 0.022 -0.014 0.033 -0.013 0.027
σ0 0.005*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
µ1 -0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.003
γ21 0.397*** 0.132 0.270*** 0.122 0.279 0.104 0.282*** 0.103
γ22 0.488 0.351 0.771 0.417 0.687** 0.330 0.677** 0.323
β1 -0.211** 0.086 -0.157** 0.072 -0.133*** 0.045 -0.132*** 0.045
η1 0.109*** 0.043 0.067** 0.033 0.057*** 0.020 0.057*** 0.019
σ1 0.010*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001
p0 0.915*** 0.037 0.897*** 0.054 0.981*** 0.014 0.981*** 0.014
q0 0.910*** 0.046 0.913*** 0.039 0.969*** 0.019 0.969*** 0.019
p1 0.962*** 0.024 - - - - - -
q1 0.940*** 0.047 - - - - - -
Likelihood 1034.200 1009.300 999.130 997.770
Notes: See notes to Table 3.
35
Table 5: Asymmetric effect of monetary policy on output growth for FD2 with
and without the level effects (1971:q1-2011:q4)
FD2 (Model B) FD2 (Model B)
Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors
µ0 0.068 0.052 0.005*** 0.001
γ11 0.335** 0.147 0.121 0.100
γ12 0.356 0.407 0.328*** 0.112
β0 -0.695 0.467 -0.081 0.184
η0 0.778 0.549 0.088 0.215
ϕ0 -0.087 0.063 - -
σ0 0.009*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
µ1 0.041 0.035 -0.007 0.009
γ21 0.085 0.189 0.352*** 0.134
γ22 0.260 0.197 0.507 0.555
β1 -0.116 0.597 -1.473** 0.591
η1 0.130 0.692 1.680** 0.649
ϕ1 -0.044 0.042 - -
σ1 0.005*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001
p0 0.873*** 0.046 0.864*** 0.064
q0 0.854*** 0.115 0.873*** 0.047
Likelihood 1261.8 1266.100
Notes: yt = µst +
∑j
i=1 γi,styt−i + βstm̂pt−1 + ϕst f̂dt + ηstm̂pt−1 × f̂dt−1 + σstεt, where yt,
m̂pt−1 and f̂dt denote output growth, expected monetary policy shock and expected financial
depth, respectively. εt is the error term. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels. Model B assumes that the unobserved states of all variables are perfectly
correlated. FD2 is the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total domestic
credit (excluding credit to money banks).
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Table 6: Asymmetric effect of monetary policy on output growth: Pre- financial
crisis period (1971:q1-2008:q2)
FD1 (Model A) FD2 (Model B)
Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors
µ0 0.004** 0.0014 0.005*** 0.002
γ11 0.185* 0.103 0.09 0.107
γ12 0.359*** 0.111 0.315*** 0.102
β0 -0.019 0.0578 0.064 0.169
η0 0.008 0.0372 -0.09 0.208
σ0 0.005*** 0.00041 0.004*** 0
µ1 -0.001 0.0044 -0.11 0.307
γ21 0.289** 0.130 0.245 0.127
γ22 0.602 0.391 6.375 16.526
β1 -0.188** 0.0845 -3.276 4.253
η1 0.098** 0.0476 2.430** 1.094
σ1 0.009*** 0.00092 0.009*** 0.001
p0 0.970*** 0.0251 0.890*** 0.056
q0 0.970*** 0.0409 0.896*** 0.046
p1 0.930*** 0.0509 - -
q1 0.935*** 0.0352 - -
Likelihood 972.91 1199.3
Notes: See notes to Tables 3 and 5.
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Table 7: Asymmetric effect of monetary policy on
output growth: Results for RR type monetary policy
shocks applied to FD2 using Model B
Proxy type RR-TVP RR-TVP MRS
Estimates Std Errors Estimates Std Errors
µ0 0.006*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.002
γ11 0.608*** 0.128 0.308** 0.143
γ12 -0.227* 0.135 0.015 0.072
β0 -0.061 0.072 -0.034 0.102
η0 0.089 0.091 0.043 0.129
σ0 0.007*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001
µ1 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
γ21 0.115 0.080 0.185** 0.094
γ22 0.379*** 0.083 0.366*** 0.092
β1 -0.179** 0.074 -0.167** 0.078
η1 0.218** 0.092 0.215** 0.098
σ1 0.005*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000
p 0.869*** 0.065 0.993*** 0.008
q 0.842*** 0.067 0.990*** 0.014
Likelihood 1090.2 1082.7
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% lev-
els. RR-TVP denotes time-varying monetary policy shock measure.
RR-TVP MRS denotes regime dependent monetary policy shock in-
dicator accounting for Markov switching heteroscedasticity.
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Table 8: Full impact of monetary policy
Panel A: State zero
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Financial
depth
0.886 0.932 1.184 1.654 1.899
∂y
∂mp
-0.014 -0.013 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006
Std. Err. 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.005
t statistic -0.874 -0.890 -1.004 -1.351 -1.211
Panel B: State 1
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Financial
depth
0.886 0.932 1.184 1.654 1.899
∂y
∂mp
-0.115 -0.110 -0.083 -0.032 -0.005
Std. Err. 0.053 0.052 0.045 0.037 0.037
t statistic -2.160 -2.125 -1.853 -0.871 -0.149
Notes: Full impact of an adverse monetary policy shock is cal-
culated for Financial Depth 1 (FD1). P denotes percentiles of
financial depth at noted levels.
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Figure 1: Filter probabilities from a single variable Markov switching model
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Figure 2: Filter probabilities for FD1 using Model A
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Figure 3
Total Probability of Being in Common States
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Notes: The upper (lower) graph plots the sum of probabilities of States 1 and 4 (2 and 3)
for FD1 using the data in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: Full impact of an adverse monetary policy shock
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Notes: The upper (lower) graph shows the full effect of an adverse monetary policy shock
during a boom (recession) with respect to financial depth, FD1.
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